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Abstract
We mathematically compare three competing
definitions of group-level nondiscrimination: de-
mographic parity, equalized odds, and calibra-
tion. Using the theoretical framework of Friedler
et al., we study the properties of each definition
under various worldviews, which are assump-
tions about how, if at all, the observed data is bi-
ased. We prove that different worldviews call for
different definitions of fairness, and we specify
when it is appropriate to use demographic par-
ity and equalized odds. In addition, we show
that calibration is insufficient because it allows
an arbitrarily large inter-group disparity. Finally,
we define a worldview that is more realistic than
the previously considered ones, and we introduce
a new notion of fairness that is suitable for this
worldview.
1. Introduction
As the field of machine learning has grown to influence
many aspects of our lives, so have concerns about the ef-
fects of its potential biases. These biases are especially
problematic if they disproportionately favor one demo-
graphic group over another. Legally, many jurisdictions
around the world prohibit discrimination on the basis of
a protected attribute, such as race or gender. One category
of prohibited discrimination is disparate impact, or indirect
discrimination, which means that the use of the model must
not result in discriminatory effect even if the discrimina-
tion is not intentional. As a result, it is not sufficient for the
model to simply avoid using the protected attribute since it
may arrive at the same result by using another attribute that
is correlated with the protected one.
Many different notions of fairness have been proposed
in efforts to better understand the issue of discrimination
in machine learning. A common notion is demographic
parity, which requires that the model give the favorable
outcome to both groups of people at equal rates. How-
ever, sometimes there are reasons to believe that the model
should not give equal outcomes, such as when predicting
physical strength for different genders. Because of this,
jurisdictions that recognize disparate impact also make ex-
ceptions for cases where there is sufficient justification for
the discriminatory effect, such as a business necessity (e.g.,
Grover, 1995; Barocas and Selbst, 2016). This motivates
moving away from demographic parity to definitions that
take the ground truth into account. One such definition,
called equalized odds by Hardt et al. (2016), requires equal
false positive and false negative rates for each protected
group. Another commonly used notion of fairness is cal-
ibration (e.g., Chouldechova, 2017), which roughly corre-
sponds to the requirement of equal positive predictive val-
ues. However, one drawback of equalized odds and cali-
bration is that the “ground truth” may be tainted by past
discrimination, in which case consulting the ground truth
will help perpetuate the discrimination.
In this work, we handle the issue of biased ground truth by
adopting the framework of Friedler et al. (2016), who make
the distinction between the observed ground truth and the
construct, which is the attribute that is truly relevant for
prediction. Using this framework, we define what it means
for a model to be discriminative, that is, able to accurately
predict the construct, and discriminatory, that is, dispro-
portionately favoring one protected group over another in
an unjustified way. Our definition of discrimination deals
with the disparity in positive classification rates, which is
a widely accepted measure of discriminatory effect in both
law (Equal Employment Opportunities Commission, 1978)
and computer science (Calders et al., 2009; Calders and
Verwer, 2010; Kamishima et al., 2012; Zemel et al., 2013;
Feldman et al., 2015; Zafar et al., 2017b). Unlike most
prior definitions, our definition also considers the benefit of
having a discriminative model, stipulating that a disparity
in the output of the model is justified by a commensurate
disparity in the construct. We note that we do not address
other aspects of discrimination, such as intentional discrim-
ination (Barocas and Selbst, 2016, §II-A).
Because the construct is usually unmeasurable, Friedler
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et al. introduce and analyze two assumptions, or world-
views, about the construct. More specifically, they define
the We’re All Equal (WAE) worldview, under which there
is no association between the construct and the protected
attribute, and the WYSIWYG worldview, under which the
observations accurately reflect the construct. We tie in the
previously defined notions of fairness with these world-
views, arguing that demographic parity is appropriate for
the WAE worldview and that equalized odds is appropriate
for the WYSIWYG worldview. We also show that cali-
bration does not impose any restrictions on the extent to
which a model discriminates. Since equalized odds and
calibration are incompatible (Darlington, 1971; Choulde-
chova, 2017; Kleinberg et al., 2017), our result is an argu-
ment for the use of equalized odds instead of calibration.
Furthermore, we compare our approach to that of Zafar et
al. (2017a) in their work on disparate mistreatment, or dis-
parate misclassification rates, showing that our definition of
nondiscrimination can be modified to apply in their setting.
Although the WAE and WYSIWYG worldviews are use-
ful for theoretical analysis, they are unlikely to be true in
practice. To remedy this issue, we introduce a family of
hybrid worldviews that is parametrized by a measure of
how biased the observed data is against a protected group
of people. This allows us to model many real-world situa-
tions by simply adjusting the parameter. We then create a
parametrized fairness definition that is suitable for the new
family of worldviews, showing how one can apply the anal-
ysis in our paper to real-world scenarios.
Our most fundamental contribution is the introduction of
a framework in which to evaluate proposed definitions of
fairness. We do not claim that the definition of nondiscrim-
ination that we use in this paper captures the only relevant
notion of nondiscrimination. Rather, we view our defini-
tion as more of a diagnostic than a goal in and of itself.
Indeed, we do not provide an algorithm for ensuring that
a model complies with our definition of nondiscrimination
since, in our view, doing so would be treating the symptom
rather than the cause. Such algorithms can eliminate one
aspect of discrimination, but may in the process create a
model that is obviously discriminatory from another angle.
When a model does not satisfy a definition of nondiscrim-
ination, it should be a starting point for investigation as to
why. While it could be that the model itself is corrupt, it
could also be due to a mismatch between the construct and
the observed data, or a need for better features. We remind
the reader that no algorithm can fix all ills.
2. Related Work
Barocas and Selbst (2016) discuss in detail the potential
legal issues with discrimination in machine learning. One
widely consulted legal standard for detecting disparate im-
pact is the four-fifths rule (Equal Employment Opportuni-
ties Commission, 1978). The four-fifths rule is a guide-
line that checks whether the ratio of the rates of favorable
outcomes for different demographic groups is at least four-
fifths. This guideline can be considered a relaxation of de-
mographic parity, which would instead require that the ratio
of the positive classification rates be exactly one.
The four-fifths rule has inspired the work of Feldman et
al. (2015) and Zafar et al. (2017b), who deal with a general-
ization of the four-fifths rule, called the p% rule, in their ef-
forts to remove disparate impact. On the other hand, many
others (Calders et al., 2009; Calders and Verwer, 2010;
Kamishima et al., 2012; Zemel et al., 2013) consider the
difference, rather than the ratio, of the positive classifica-
tion rates. Our definition of nondiscrimination is a gen-
eralization of this difference-based measure, but it differs
from the others in that it uses the construct rather than the
observed data.
Friedler et al. (2016) introduced the concept of the con-
struct in fair machine learning. Although they also use the
construct in their definition of nondiscrimination, their def-
inition uses the Gromov–Wasserstein distance and as a re-
sult is more difficult to compute and reason about. One
benefit of their approach is that it enables their treatment of
fairness at both an individual level and a group level. By
contrast, we adopt a definition that is specialized for the
consideration of group nondiscrimination only.
Other works in the field of fair machine learning deal with
aspects of discrimination that are not well described by
positive classification rates. Datta et al. (2017) tackle the
issue that some parts of a model could be discriminatory
even if the model, when taken as a whole, does not appear
to have discriminatory effect. Zafar et al. (2017a) point
out a that a model can have a higher misclassification rate
for one protected group than another, and they propose a
method for mitigating this form of discrimination. Hardt
et al. (2016) characterize nondiscrimination through equal-
ized odds, which requires that two measures of misclas-
sification, false positive and false negative rates, be equal
for all protected groups. Finally, calibration, Choulde-
chova (2017) points out, is widely accepted in the “educa-
tional and psychological testing and assessment literature”.
In this paper, we prove that equalized odds, but not cali-
bration, is sometimes a useful way to satisfy our definition
of nondiscrimination. We refer the reader to a survey by
Romei and Ruggieri (2014) for a discussion of other mea-
sures of discrimination.
As mentioned previously, discriminatory effect can be jus-
tified if there is a sufficient reason. For prediction tasks,
it is natural to think of accuracy as a sufficient justifica-
tion. Zafar et al. (2017b) handle this by solving an opti-
mization problem to maximize fairness subject to some ac-
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curacy constraints. This reflects the idea that a classifier is
justified in sacrificing fairness for accuracy. To a lesser ex-
tent, equalized odds and calibration can also be thought of
as motivated by the dual desires for accuracy and fairness.
Our approach to justification is also motivated by these de-
sires, but we use the construct and say that a classifier is
justified in predicting the construct correctly.
3. Notation
In the framework introduced by Friedler et al. (2016), there
are three spaces that describe the target attribute of a pre-
diction model. The construct space represents the value of
the attribute that is truly relevant for the prediction task.
This value is usually unmeasurable, so prediction models
in a supervised learning problem are instead trained with
a related measurable label, whose values reside in the ob-
served space. Finally, the prediction space (called decision
space by Friedler et al.) describes the output of the model.
We will use Y ′, Y , and Yˆ as the random variables repre-
senting values from the construct, observed, and prediction
spaces, respectively. (See Figure 1.)
In addition, we will use Z to denote the protected attribute
at hand, and we will assume that Z ∈ {0, 1}. For ex-
ample, if Z is gender, the values 0 and 1 could represent
male and female, respectively. Although the input features
X = (X1, . . . , Xn) are also critical for both the training
and the prediction of the model, they are rarely used in this
paper.
Example 1. Some jurisdictions have started to use ma-
chine learning models to predict how much risk a
criminal defendant poses (Liptak, 2017). Judges are
then allowed to consider the risk score as one of
many factors when making bail or sentencing deci-
sions (Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 2016). Using
the three-space framework of Friedler et al. (2016),
we can represent the risk score output by the model
as Yˆ . The model would be trained with the observa-
tion Y , which in this case may be recorded data about
past criminal defendants and their failures to appear in
court (bail) or recidivism (sentencing). These models
would also be trained with features X from the input
space, such as age and criminal history.
For sentencing decisions, presumably we want to
know whether the defendant will commit another
crime in the future, regardless of whether the defen-
dant will be caught committing the crime. There-
fore, we argue that the recorded recidivism rate Y
is merely a proxy for the actual reoffense rate Y ′,
which is the relevant attribute for the prediction task.
There is evidence that black Americans are arrested
at a higher rate than white Americans for the same
crime (Mueller, 2018), so it is reasonable to suspect
that Y is a racially biased proxy for Y ′.
Example 2. Universities want the students that they ad-
mit to the university to be successful in the univer-
sity (Y ′). Because success is a vague term that en-
compasses many factors, a model that predicts suc-
cess in university would instead be trained with a more
concrete measure, such as graduating within six years
(Y ). This model may take inputs such as a student’s
high-school grades and standardized test scores (X),
and will output a prediction of how likely the student
is to graduate within six years (Yˆ ). Admissions offi-
cers can then use this prediction to guide their decision
about whether to admit the student.
It is important to note that the models in the above exam-
ples do not make the final decision and that human judg-
ments are a major part of the decision process. However,
we are concerned about the fairness of the model rather
than that of the entire decision process. Thus, we focus on
Yˆ , the output of the model, rather than the final decision
made using it. In addition, although the use of the pro-
tected attribute Z is generally prohibited, it is sometimes
allowed for affirmative action, or positive discrimination,
that aims to correct a demographic disparity. For exam-
ple, many U.S. universities take the race and gender of the
students into account with the goal of admitting a diverse
group of students. We limit the scope of our work to the
case where the model is not trained with affirmative action
or diversity as one of its objectives. The human-led deci-
sion process that uses Yˆ may still consider these objectives.
4. Preliminary Definitions
In this work, we use the total variation distance to measure
the extent to which two categorical random variables differ.
Definition 1 (Total Variation Distance). Let Y0 and Y1 be
categorical random variables with finite support Y . Then,
the total variation distance between Y0 and Y1 is
dtv(Y0, Y1) =
1
2
∑
y∈Y
∣∣∣Pr[Y0=y]− Pr[Y1=y]∣∣∣.
In the special case where Y0, Y1 ∈ {0, 1}, the total variation
distance can also be expressed as |Pr[Y0=1]− Pr[Y1=1]|.
4.1. Fairness Definitions as Empirical Tests
Many definitions of fairness for prediction models have
been proposed previously, and here we restate three of
them. In all three definitions, the probabilities are taken
over random draws of data points from the data distribu-
tion, as well as any randomness used by the model.
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Construct
space
(Y ′)
Observed
space
(Y )
Prediction
space
(Yˆ )
Worldviews
Fairness
(Empirical Tests)
Nondiscrimination, Optimality
Figure 1. Three relevant spaces for prediction models. The space of input features X = (X1, . . . , Xn) is not depicted here. The
observed space and the prediction space are measurable, and the fairness definitions, which are interpreted as empirical tests (Def-
initions 2, 3, 4), impose constraints on the relationship between the two spaces. On the other hand, the construct space is usually
unmeasurable, so we must assume a particular worldview (e.g., Worldview 1 or 2) about how the construct space relates to the observed
space, if at all. Then, we can characterize nondiscrimination and optimality, which relate the construct space to the prediction space.
Definition 2 (Demographic Parity Test). A model passes
the demographic parity test if, for all yˆ,
Pr[Yˆ=yˆ | Z=0] = Pr[Yˆ=yˆ | Z=1].
Definition 3 (Equalized Odds Test (Hardt et al., 2016)). A
model passes the equalized odds test if, for all y and yˆ,
Pr[Yˆ=yˆ | Y=y, Z=0] = Pr[Yˆ=yˆ | Y=y, Z=1].
Definition 4 (Calibration Test (Chouldechova, 2017)). A
model passes the calibration test if, for all y and yˆ,
Pr[Y=y | Yˆ=yˆ, Z=0] = Pr[Y=y | Yˆ=yˆ, Z=1].
Because much of the previous work does not make the
distinction between the construct space and the observed
space, there is some ambiguity about whether Y ′ or Y is
the appropriate variable to use these definitions. In this pa-
per, we interpret these definitions to be empirical tests that
can verify whether a model is fair. As a result, none of the
above definitions include the construct Y ′.
Although all of the above definitions were created for the
purpose of characterizing nondiscrimination, we will refer
to them as fairness definitions or empirical tests in order to
clearly contrast them with the definition of nondiscrimina-
tion that we later introduce.
4.2. Worldviews
Our intuitive notion of nondiscrimination involves the re-
lationship between the construct space and the prediction
space. For example, consider the context of recidivism pre-
diction described in Example 1. Suppose that one group
of people is much more likely to be arrested for the same
crime than another group. Then, the disparity in arrest rates
can cause the recorded recidivism rate Y to be biased, and
a model trained using such Y would likely learn to dis-
criminate as a result. If in fact the two groups have equal
reoffense rates Y ′, it would hardly be considered justified
that one group tends to be given longer sentences as a result
of the bias in Y .
However, because Y ′ is typically unmeasurable, in prac-
tice we do not know whether Y ′ is the same for both
groups. Therefore, to reason about nondiscrimination us-
ing the construct space, we must make assumptions about
the construct space. Two such assumptions, or worldviews,
have previously been introduced by Friedler et al. (2016)
and are described below. Our versions of these world-
views are simpler than the original because they are exact,
whereas the original versions allow deviations by some pa-
rameter .
Worldview 1 (We’re All Equal). Under the We’re All
Equal (WAE) worldview, every group is identical with re-
spect to the construct space. More formally, Y ′ is indepen-
dent of Z, i.e., Y ′ ⊥ Z.
Worldview 2 (WYSIWYG). Under the What You See
Is What You Get (WYSIWYG) worldview, the observed
space accurately reflects the construct space. More for-
mally, Y ′ = Y .
5. Discriminatory Association
In this section, we introduce our definition of nondiscrimi-
nation and use it to analyze the suitability of existing fair-
ness definitions under different worldviews. We first begin
with case where Y ′ and Yˆ are categorical, and in the ap-
pendix we show how to generalize the definition to numer-
ical Y ′.
Our definition of nondiscrimination is motivated by the fol-
lowing two concerns: First, we want the model to be dis-
criminative, i.e., the output of the model should accurately
reflect the value of Y ′. We formalize this goal with the
following definition of optimality.
Definition 5 (Optimality). We say that a model is optimal
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if its output Yˆ and the construct Y ′ are always equal.
It is important to note that enforcing a fairness definition
does not necessarily result in an optimal model. In fact, be-
cause the construct Y ′ is usually unmeasurable, it is likely
impossible in practice to train a model that is optimal under
our definition. However, this definition is sufficient for our
purposes because we simply use it to argue that a fairness
definition should not preclude a perfectly predictive model.
Second, we do not want the model to have a discrimina-
tory effect. When Yˆ is binary, the size of the discrimina-
tory effect is commonly measured by |Pr[Yˆ=1|Z=0] −
Pr[Yˆ=1|Z=1]|, or the difference in positive classification
rates. Definition 6 is a generalization of this measure for
the case of non-binary categorical Yˆ .
Definition 6 (Output Disparity). Let the output Yˆ of a
model be categorical. The output disparity of the model
is the quantity dtv(Yˆ |Z=0, Yˆ |Z=1).
However, not all output disparities are bad. In particular,
because we want the model to be discriminative, we allow
an output disparity insofar as it can be explained by the
inter-group disparity in Y ′. This happens when
dtv(Yˆ |Z=0, Yˆ |Z=1) ≤ dtv(Y ′|Z=0, Y ′|Z=1). (1)
Since a model can have issues with discrimination that are
not well characterized by output disparity (discussed be-
low), Equation 1 is not the conclusive definition of nondis-
crimination. Therefore, we use the logical negation of
Equation 1 as the definition of one particular form of dis-
crimination, which occurs when an output disparity is not
explained by Y ′.
Definition 7 (Discriminatory Association). Let Y ′ and Yˆ
be categorical. Then, a model exhibits discriminatory as-
sociation that is unexplainable by Y ′ (DAU-Y ′) if
dtv(Yˆ |Z=0, Yˆ |Z=1) > dtv(Y ′|Z=0, Y ′|Z=1). (2)
Note that the equality in Equation 1 holds for every optimal
model. In other words, an optimal model displays the max-
imum amount of output disparity allowed by Definition 7.
On the other hand, if the output disparity is greater than the
disparity in Y ′, the model must be discriminating in a way
that cannot be explained by Y ′.
Of course, there are forms of discrimination that are not
well described by output disparity alone. For example, a
model could have a higher misclassification rate for one
group of people (Zafar et al., 2017a), and Definition 7 is
not well suited for detecting such errors. In addition, even if
Definition 7 does not show a violation (i.e., Equation 2 does
not hold) for the entire model, it is possible that some part
of the model is a proxy for the protected attribute and that
Table 1. Summary of the results in Section 5. We say that a fair-
ness definition is appropriate for a worldview if it precludes DAU-
Y ′ (Definition 7) but does not preclude a perfectly predictive
model. The demographic parity test is appropriate when the We’re
All Equal (WAE) worldview holds, but otherwise the resulting
models are necessarily suboptimal. The equalized odds test is ap-
propriate when the WYSIWYG worldview holds, but otherwise
it does not effectively prevent discrimination. Finally, regardless
of the worldview, the calibration test does not effectively prevent
discrimination. Here, we assume that WAE and WYSIWYG do
not hold simultaneously.
We’re All Equal
(Worldview 1)
WYSIWYG
(Worldview 2)
Dem. Parity
(Definition 2)
4
Theorem 1
Suboptimal
Theorem 2
Eq. Odds
(Definition 3)
Possibly discrim.
Theorem 4
4
Theorem 3
Calibration
(Definition 4)
Possibly discriminatory
Theorem 5
it causes a discriminatory effect. In their work on proxy
use, Datta et al. (2017) show that the input/output behavior
of the model does not give enough information to decide
whether a model uses a proxy of the protected attribute. As
a result, we would have to look at the internal details of
the model to determine whether any part of the model is
discriminatory. On the other hand, Definition 7 is intended
to be a general, model-agnostic way to incriminate, but not
necessary absolve, a model.
We are now ready to argue about the suitability of an em-
pirical test for a particular worldview. If an empirical test
disallows an optimal model, we can conclude that the test
is too strict in a way that lowers the utility of the model.
On the other hand, if a test does not guarantee the lack of
DAU-Y ′, it is insufficient as an anti-discrimination mea-
sure. Therefore, to argue that an empirical test is appropri-
ate, we will prove the following two statements: (a) Every
model that passes the empirical test does not have DAU-Y ′,
and (b) every optimal model passes the empirical test.
We apply this reasoning to demographic parity (Defini-
tion 2) and equalized odds (Definition 3), showing that
these empirical tests are appropriate for the WAE and
WYSIWYG worldviews, respectively. More formally, we
will prove that the above statements are true for every joint
distribution of Y ′, Y , Yˆ , and Z that is consistent with the
worldview. Table 1 summarizes these results.
5.1. Demographic Parity and WAE
Theorem 1. A model that passes the demographic parity
test does not have DAU-Y ′ under Definition 7. Moreover,
if the WAE worldview holds, every optimal model satisfies
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demographic parity.
Proof. By the definition of demographic parity, the left-
hand side of Equation 2 is dtv(Yˆ |Z=0, Yˆ |Z=1) = 0.
Since the total variation distance is always nonnegative, de-
mographic parity ensures the lack of DAU-Y ′.
If the WAE worldview holds, we have Y ′ ⊥ Z, so every
optimal model satisfies Yˆ ⊥ Z. This implies demographic
parity by Definition 2.
The first part of Theorem 1 shows that we can guarantee
that a model will not have DAU-Y ′ by training it to pass
the demographic parity test. However, this does not mean
that demographic parity is appropriate for every situation.
First, we remind the reader that the lack of DAU-Y ′ does
not mean that the model will be free of all issues related
to discrimination. In particular, DAU-Y ′ is only designed
to catch the type of discrimination akin to disparate im-
pact. If the WAE worldview holds, demographic parity is
the only way to avoid DAU-Y ′, so it makes sense to en-
force demographic parity. On the other hand, if the WAE
worldview does not hold, enforcing demographic parity
may introduce other forms of discrimination. For example,
the U.S. Supreme Court held in Ricci v. DeStefano (2009)
that the prohibition against intentional discrimination can
sometimes override the consideration of disparate impact,
ruling that an employer unlawfully discriminated by dis-
carding the results of a bona fide job-related test simply
because of a racial performance gap.
Second, demographic parity can unnecessarily lower the
utility of a model. In fact, Theorem 2 shows that, if the
joint distribution of Y ′, Y , Yˆ , and Z is not consistent with
the WAE worldview, any model that satisfies demographic
parity must be suboptimal.
Theorem 2. If the WAE worldview does not hold, no opti-
mal model satisfies demographic parity.
Proof. If the WAE worldview does not hold,
dtv(Y
′|Z=0, Y ′|Z=1), the right-hand side of Equa-
tion 2, is positive. Therefore, the left-hand side
dtv(Yˆ |Z=0, Yˆ |Z=1) must be positive for an optimal
model. On the other hand, if a model satisfies demographic
parity, the left-hand side must be zero. Therefore, no
optimal model can satisfy demographic parity.
Theorem 1 and 2 demonstrate that the demographic parity
test is best suited for a setting where the WAE worldview
holds.
5.2. Equalized Odds and WYSIWYG
We now argue that a similar relationship exists between the
equalized odds test and the WYSIWYG worldview.
Theorem 3. If the WYSIWYG worldview holds, a model
that passes the equalized odds test does not have DAU-Y ′
under Definition 7. Moreover, if the WYSIWYG worldview
holds, every optimal model satisfies equalized odds.
Proof. Let Y ′ and Yˆ be the supports of Y ′ and Yˆ , respec-
tively. Applying the WYSIWYG worldview to the defini-
tion of equalized odds, we get Pr[Yˆ=yˆ | Y ′=y′, Z=0] =
Pr[Yˆ=yˆ | Y ′=y′, Z=1] = Pr[Yˆ=yˆ | Y ′=y′] for all
y′ ∈ Y ′ and yˆ ∈ Yˆ . Therefore, we have
dtv(Yˆ |Z=0, Yˆ |Z=1)
= 12
∑
yˆ∈Yˆ
∣∣Pr[Yˆ=yˆ | Z=0]− Pr[Yˆ=yˆ | Z=1]∣∣
= 12
∑
yˆ∈Yˆ
∣∣∣∑y′∈Y′ Pr[Yˆ=yˆ | Y ′=y′]
· (Pr[Y ′=y′ | Z=0]− Pr[Y ′=y′ | Z=1])∣∣∣
≤ 12
∑
yˆ∈Yˆ
∑
y′∈Y′ Pr[Yˆ=yˆ | Y ′=y′]
· ∣∣Pr[Y ′=y′ | Z=0]− Pr[Y ′=y′ | Z=1]∣∣
= 12
∑
y′∈Y′
(∣∣Pr[Y ′=y′ | Z=0]− Pr[Y ′=y′ | Z=1]∣∣
·∑yˆ∈Yˆ Pr[Yˆ=yˆ | Y ′=y′])
= 12
∑
y′∈Y′
∣∣Pr[Y ′=y′ | Z=0]− Pr[Y ′=y′ | Z=1]∣∣
= dtv(Y
′|Z=0, Y ′|Z=1).
This concludes the proof of the first statement.
For an optimal model, we have Yˆ = Y ′ = Y by the WYSI-
WYG worldview. Because Y fully determines the value of
Yˆ , it follows from Definition 3 that every optimal model
satisfies equalized odds.
We conclude this section with the following theorem,
which states that equalized odds does not guarantee nondis-
crimination unless the WYSIWYG worldview holds. We
omit the proof due to its simplicity, but this result is consis-
tent with our intuition that an output disparity is unjustified
if it is due to a bias in the observation process.
Theorem 4. If the WYSIWYG worldview does not hold, a
model with equalized odds can still have DAU-Y ′.
5.3. Insufficiency of Calibration
Switching Y ′ and Yˆ in the proof of Theorem 3 shows
that the calibration test, when combined with the WYSI-
WYG worldview, ensures that dtv(Yˆ |Z=0, Yˆ |Z=1) ≥
dtv(Y
′|Z=0, Y ′|Z=1). The inequality here is in the op-
posite direction of that in Equation 1, so the calibration test
does not place any upper bound on the output disparity and
guarantees that it is at least as large as can be explained by
Y ′. In fact, the following theorem shows that, regardless
of the worldview, even a model with almost the maximum
output disparity can still pass the calibration test.
6
Theorem 5. Let Y be a categorical random variable with
finite support such that Pr[Y=y | Z=z] is positive for
all y and z. Then, for any sufficiently small  > 0, there
exists a model that passes the calibration test such that
dtv(Yˆ |Z=0, Yˆ |Z=1) = 1− .
Proof. The main idea behind the proof is that the model
simply outputs the value of Z. However, because calibra-
tion is not well-defined if Pr[Yˆ=yˆ, Z=z] = 0 for any yˆ
and z, we must allow the model to output the other value
with some very small probability. More specifically, we
construct a model such that
Pr[Yˆ=yˆ | Z=z] =
{
1− 2 , if yˆ = z

2 , if yˆ 6= z.
We can choose which values our constructed model out-
puts, so assume without loss of generality that Yˆ ∈ {0, 1}.
Let Y be the support of Y . By the calibration test, we
have Pr[Y=y | Yˆ=yˆ, Z=0] = Pr[Y=y | Yˆ=yˆ, Z=1] =
Pr[Y=y | Yˆ=yˆ] for all y ∈ Y and yˆ ∈ {0, 1}. Let
pyyˆ = Pr[Y=y | Yˆ=yˆ]. Our goal is to find the values
of py0 and py1 that are consistent with the fixed observed
probabilities Pr[Y=y | Z=0] and Pr[Y=1 | Z=1].
By the law of total probability, our model must satisfy(
Pr[Y=y | Z=0]
Pr[Y=y | Z=1]
)
=
(
1− 2 2

2 1− 2
)(
py0
py1
)
.
Solving for py0 and py1, we see that they converge to
Pr[Y=y | Z=0] and Pr[Y=y | Z=1], respectively, as 
approaches zero. By assumption, these probabilities are
positive. Since Y is finite, this means that there exists
a small enough  > 0 such that py0, py1 > 0 for all
y ∈ Y . Moreover, it is easy to verify that ∑y∈Y py0 =∑
y∈Y py1 = 1, making them valid probability distribu-
tions.
Now, when given Y=y and Z=z, our model can output
Yˆ=yˆ with probability
Pr[Yˆ=yˆ | Y=y, Z=z] = pyyˆ · Pr[Yˆ=yˆ | Z=z]
Pr[Y=y | Z=z] ,
where Pr[Yˆ=yˆ | Z=z] is either 2 or 1 − 2 depending on
whether yˆ = z.
Because the calibration test allows models, such as the one
we constructed in the above proof, that are clearly discrim-
inatory, it is unsuitable for ensuring nondiscrimination as
characterized by output disparity. As a result, in the rest of
the paper we focus on the equalized odds test rather than
the calibration test.
5.4. Connection to Misclassification
Here, we show that our definition of nondiscrimination is
closely related to the that given by Zafar et al. (2017a) in
their treatment of disparate misclassification rates. First,
we motivate the issue of disparate misclassification rates
with an example. Let Y ′ and Z be independent and uni-
formly random binary variables. If Yˆ = Y ′ ⊕ Z, where
⊕ is the bitwise XOR, both protected groups are given the
positive label exactly half of the time, so there is no output
disparity. However, one group always receives the correct
classification and the other always receives the incorrect
classification, so the disparity in the misclassification rates
is as large as it can be. This shows that a lack of DAU-Y ′
does not imply a lack of disparity in misclassification rates.
Conversely, a lack of disparity in misclassification rates
does not imply a lack of DAU-Y ′. To see this, mod-
ify the above example so that Yˆ = Z instead. In
this case, both groups have half of its members misclas-
sified since Z is independent of Y ′, so they have the
same overall misclassification rate. On the other hand,
we have dtv(Y ′|Z=0, Y ′|Z=1) = dtv(Y ′, Y ′) = 0 and
dtv(Yˆ |Z=0, Yˆ |Z=1) = dtv(Z|Z=0, Z|Z=1) = 1. Thus,
Yˆ has DAU-Y ′.
However, we can still find a connection between misclas-
sification parity and DAU-Y ′. Let C = 1(Y ′ = Yˆ ),
and replace Yˆ with C in the definition of output disparity
(Definition 6). Since C is binary, the resulting expression
dtv(C|Z=0, C|Z=1) is simply the difference in the mis-
classification rates. We would like to compare this value to
some measure of disparity in the construct space. Since our
standard measure of dtv(Y ′|Z=0, Y ′|Z=1) does not nec-
essarily justify inter-group differences in C, it may not be
a correct measure to use. Exploring what measures provide
justification for disparate misclassification rates is interest-
ing future work.
6. Hybrid Worldviews
So far, we have assumed either the WAE or the WYSIWYG
worldview. While these worldviews are interesting from a
theoretical perspective, in practice it is unlikely that these
worldviews hold. For example, for recidivism prediction as
described in Example 1, there are reasons to believe that Y
is tainted by past discrimination, rendering the WYSIWYG
worldview unsuitable. On the other hand, the recorded re-
cidivism rate Y is still strongly related to the actual reof-
fense rate Y ′, so it is plausible that at least some of the
racial disparity in Y is also present in the actual reoffense
rate Y ′. As a result, the WAE worldview is also unsuitable.
In this section, we propose a family of more realistic world-
views for the case where Y ′ and Y are categorical. As we
have depicted in Figure 1, worldviews describe the relation-
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ship between the construct and observed spaces. Because
our definition of DAU-Y ′ has to do with inter-group dispar-
ities, here we focus specifically on the inter-group dispari-
ties in Y ′ and Y . Note that the WAE worldview has the ef-
fect of assuming that none of the disparity in Y is explained
by Y ′. By contrast, under the WYSIWYG worldview, all
of the disparity in Y is explained by Y ′. Described below is
the α-Hybrid worldview, which is a family of worldviews
that occupy the space between the two extremes of WAE
and WYSIWYG.
Worldview 3 (α-Hybrid). Let α ∈ [0, 1]. Under the α-
Hybrid worldview, exactly α fraction of the disparity in Y
is explained by Y ′. More formally,
dtv(Y
′|Z=0, Y ′|Z=1) = α · dtv(Y |Z=0, Y |Z=1) (3)
It is easy to see that the WAE worldview is equivalent to
the 0-Hybrid worldview. On the other hand, the relation-
ship between the WYSIWYG and 1-Hybrid worldviews is
only unidirectional. Although the WYSIWYG worldview
implies the 1-Hybrid worldview, there are plenty of ways
to satisfy dtv(Y ′|Z=0, Y ′|Z=1) = dtv(Y |Z=0, Y |Z=1)
even when the equality Y ′ = Y does not hold. If we
wanted to make the relationship bidirectional, we could
instead have assumed that Y ′ can be broken down into
two components, one of which satisfies WAE and the other
WYSIWYG. However, this would mean that every com-
ponent of Y ′ is either equal with respect to Z (WAE) or
measurable (WYSIWYG), whereas in practice many inter-
group disparities in the construct space are not easily mea-
surable. Therefore, to make the α-Hybrid worldview more
realistic, we sacrifice one direction of the relationship be-
tween the WYSIWYG and 1-Hybrid worldviews.
Now we introduce the α-disparity test and prove that it
is suitable for use with the α-Hybrid worldview. Unlike
the demographic parity and equalized odds tests, the α-
disparity test is parametrized and therefore can be applied
to various real-world situations.
Definition 8 (α-Disparity Test). A model passes the α-
disparity test if
dtv(Yˆ |Z=0, Yˆ |Z=1) ≤ α · dtv(Y |Z=0, Y |Z=1). (4)
Theorem 6. If the α-Hybrid worldview holds, a model that
passes the α-disparity test does not have DAU-Y ′ under
Definition 7. Moreover, if the α-Hybrid worldview holds,
every optimal model satisfies the α-disparity test.
Proof. To prove the first part of the theorem, we simply
combine the inequality guaranteed by the α-disparity test
(Equation 4) with the equation that defines the α-Hybrid
worldview (Equation 3). Then, we get
dtv(Yˆ |Z=0, Yˆ |Z=1) ≤ α · dtv(Y |Z=0, Y |Z=1)
= dtv(Y
′|Z=0, Y ′|Z=1),
which is what we want.
For the second part of the theorem, an optimal model has
Y ′ = Yˆ , so we can substitute the Y ′ in Equation 3 with Yˆ
to get
dtv(Yˆ |Z=0, Yˆ |Z=1) = α · dtv(Y |Z=0, Y |Z=1).
This is simply the equality in Equation 4, so we are done.
The α-disparity test is closely related to demographic par-
ity and equalized odds. 0-disparity is satisfied if and only
if the output disparity is zero, so it is equivalent to demo-
graphic parity. In addition, we can easily adapt the proof of
Theorem 3 to show that equalized odds implies 1-disparity.
However, because equalized odds imposes a condition for
each possible value of Y , 1-disparity does not imply equal-
ized odds. Although it may thus seem that equalized odds
is stronger and better than 1-disparity, recent results by
Corbett-Davies and Goel (2018) show that the threshold
rule, which they argue is optimal, does not lead to equal-
ized odds in general. Therefore, there is a trade-off between
the stronger fairness guarantee provided by equalized odds
and the higher utility that is attainable under 1-disparity. Of
course, the 1-disparity test has the additional benefit that it
can be generalized to other values of α.
7. Conclusion
We showed that demographic parity and equalized odds are
related and that the difference between them boils down to
one’s worldview. In addition, we proved that calibration
allows a model with an arbitrarily large output disparity
regardless of the worldview, arguing that calibration should
not be used to enforce nondiscrimination as characterized
by output disparity.
Our work differs from much of the prior work in that we
consider the construct as separate from the observed data.
In particular, we interpreted the existing fairness definitions
as acting on the observed data, whereas discrimination was
viewed as a property of the construct. This bifurcation al-
lowed us to handle the following issues simultaneously: (a)
Disparate impact can be justified by a sufficiently good rea-
son such as a business necessity, but (b) due to past discrim-
ination, the observed data can be biased in an unjustified
way. It is the second of these points that motivates our use
of worldviews to characterize how biased the observed data
is.
To illustrate how this might work in practice, let us revisit
the examples in Section 3. In Example 1, there are reasons
to believe that the observed recidivism rate is a racially bi-
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ased measurement of the actual reoffense rate. In Exam-
ple 2, for various socioeconomic reasons, some protected
groups may have disproportionately many people who take
longer than six years to graduate but are eventually consid-
ered successful in the university. Therefore, the α-Hybrid
worldview best characterizes these real-world scenarios,
and the value of α reflects one’s beliefs about how much
more biased the observed data is than the construct. The
creator of a model could then use the α-disparity test to
make sure that the model does not have a discriminatory
effect that is unexplainable by the construct.
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A. Stronger Definition of Nondiscrimination
In this section, we strengthen our definition of nondiscrim-
ination in a way that is applicable even in the case where
Y ′ is not categorical.
A.1. Additional Preliminary Definitions
When dealing with numerical random variables, we want
our notion of distance to take into account the magnitude
of the difference in the numerical values. We will thus
use the earthmover distance throughout this section. The
following definition assumes that the random variables are
continuous, but a similar definition is applicable when they
are discrete.
Definition 9 (Earthmover Distance). Let Y0 and Y1 be con-
tinuous numerical random variables with probability den-
sity functions p0 and p1 defined over support Y . Further-
more, let Γ be the set of joint probability density functions
γ(u, v) such that
∫
Y γ(u, v) dv = p0(u) for all u ∈ Y and∫
Y γ(u, v) du = p1(v) for all v ∈ Y . Then, the earthmover
distance between Y0 and Y1 is
dem(Y0, Y1) = inf
γ∈Γ
∫
Y
∫
Y
γ(u, v) d(u, v) du dv,
where d is a distance metric defined over Y .
The joint probability density function γ has marginal distri-
butions that correspond to Y0 and Y1. Intuitively, if we use
the graphs of the probability density functions p0 and p1 to
represent mounds of sand, γ corresponds to a transporta-
tion plan that dictates how much sand to transport in order
to reshape the p0 mound into the p1 mound. In particular,
the value of γ(u, v) is the amount of sand to be transported
from u to v. The distance d(u, v) can then be interpreted as
the cost of transporting one unit of sand from u to v, and the
earthmover distance is simply the cost of the transportation
plan γ that incurs the least cost.
Now we define Lipschitz continuity.
Definition 10. Let f : Y → R be a function, and let d be a
distance metric defined over Y . f is ρ-Lipschitz continuous
if, for all u, v ∈ Y ,
|f(u)− f(v)| ≤ ρ · d(u, v). (5)
A.2. Main Result
Definition 7 allows an output disparity if there exists an
equally large disparity in Y ′, but it does not explicitly re-
flect the fact that we care about how the model came to
exhibit the disparity. The only reason why we allow the
disparity is that Y ′ is the right attribute to use. Thus, if the
model does not use Y ′ at all, then there should be no out-
put disparity. More formally, we want that if Y ′ ⊥ Yˆ , then
Yˆ ⊥ Z.
Definition 11 generalizes this requirement and, unlike Def-
inition 7, is applicable for both categorical and numerical
Y ′ at the expense of limiting Yˆ to be binary. The gener-
alization deals with cases where Yˆ is not completely inde-
pendent of Y ′ by measuring of how much Yˆ depends upon
Y ′. For binary Yˆ , this dependence is captured by the like-
lihood function `(y′) = Pr[Yˆ=1 | Y ′=y′], and we use the
Lipschitz continuity of this function to measure the depen-
dence.
Definition 11 (Discriminatory Association, Stronger). For
Yˆ ∈ {0, 1} and `(y′) = Pr[Yˆ=1 | Y ′=y′], let ρ∗` be the
smallest nonnegative ρ such that ` is ρ-Lipschitz contin-
uous.1 Then, a model exhibits discriminatory association
that is unexplainable by Y ′ (DAU-Y ′) if
dtv(Yˆ |Z=0, Yˆ |Z=1) > ρ∗` ·dem(Y ′|Z=0, Y ′|Z=1). (6)
ρ∗` characterizes how much impact Y
′ can have on the out-
put of the model. If the impact is small, we can conclude
that the model is not using Y ′ much, so not much output
disparity can be explained by Y ′. On the other hand, if a
small change in Y ′ can cause a large change in the proba-
bility distribution of Yˆ , then even a large output disparity
can possibly be due to a small inter-group difference in Y ′.
In fact, the use of ρ∗` makes Definition 11 invariant to scal-
ing in Y ′. If a numerical Y ′ is increased by some factor,
ρ∗` will decrease by the same factor, so the quantity on the
right-hand side of Equation 6 will not change.
We now give two arguments that Definition 11 is the correct
refinement of the previous definition (Definition 7). First,
we show that the new definition is a broader definition of
unexplainable discrimination than the previous one. The
previous definition assumes that Y ′ is categorical, and in
this case a natural distance metric for its support Y ′ is the
indicator d(u, v) = 1(u 6= v). With this distance metric,
we can relate the total variation distance used in the right-
hand side of Equation 2 with the earthmover distance used
in Equation 6.
Theorem 7. Let the construct Y ′ be categorical with sup-
port Y ′, which has distance metric d(u, v) = 1(u 6= v).
1Technically, ρ∗` should be the infimum of all ρ such that ` is
ρ-Lipschitz continuous, but it is not difficult to show then that ` is
in fact ρ∗` -Lipschitz continuous.10
If a model has DAU-Y ′ under Definition 7, the model has
DAU-Y ′ under Definition 11 as well.
Proof. We proceed by showing that ρ∗` ·
dem(Y
′|Z=0, Y ′|Z=1) ≤ dtv(Y ′|Z=0, Y ′|Z=1).
Since the likelihood function ` in Definition 11 is always
between 0 and 1, we have |`(u)−`(v)| ≤ 1 = d(u, v) when
u 6= v, so ` is 1-Lipschitz continuous. Therefore ρ∗` ≤
1, and it suffices to show that dem(Y ′|Z=0, Y ′|Z=1) ≤
dtv(Y
′|Z=0, Y ′|Z=1).
By (Gibbs and Su, 2002, Theorem 4), we get
dem(Y
′|Z=0, Y ′|Z=1)
≤
(
max
u,v∈Y′
d(u, v)
)
· dtv(Y ′|Z=0, Y ′|Z=1)
= dtv(Y
′|Z=0, Y ′|Z=1),
so we are done.
Second, we show that Theorems 1 and 3 still hold under the
refined definition of DAU-Y ′. Since the definitions of op-
timality and the empirical tests have not changed, we focus
strictly on the nondiscrimination portions of the theorems.
Theorem 8. A model that passes the demographic parity
test does not have DAU-Y ′ under Definition 11.
The proof of Theorem 8 is very similar to that of Theorem 1
and will thus be omitted.
Theorem 9. If the WYSIWYG worldview holds, then a
model that passes the equalized odds test does not have
DAU-Y ′ under Definition 11.
Proof. We present the proof for the case where Y ′ is con-
tinuous, but the proof for the discrete case is very simi-
lar. Let p0 and p1 be the probability density functions of
Y ′|Z=0 and Y ′|Z=1, respectively. By Kantorovich dual-
ity (Villani, 2008, Equation 5.4), we have
dem(Y
′|Z=0, Y ′|Z=1)
≥
∫
Y′
φ(v) p1(v) dv −
∫
Y′
ψ(u) p0(u) du (7)
for all φ and ψ such that φ(v) − ψ(u) ≤ d(u, v) for all
u, v ∈ Y ′. We set φ(v) = ψ(v) = `(v)/ρ∗` , where ` and
ρ∗` are defined as in Definition 11. Then, φ(v) − ψ(u) =
(`(v)− `(u))/ρ∗` ≤ d(u, v) by Lipschitz continuity. Thus,
Equation 7 applies and implies that
ρ∗` · dem(Y ′|Z=0, Y ′|Z=1)
≥
∫
Y′
`(v) p1(v) dv −
∫
Y′
`(u) p0(u) du. (8)
By the WYSIWYG worldview and the definition of equal-
ized odds, we have `(y) = Pr[Yˆ=1 | Y ′=y] = Pr[Yˆ=1 |
Y ′=y, Z=0] = Pr[Yˆ=1 | Y ′=y, Z=1]. Therefore, we
can use the law of total probability to rewrite the first term
on the right-hand side of Equation 8 as Pr[Yˆ=1 | Z=1],
and similarly the second term becomes Pr[Yˆ=1 | Z=0].
If we let φ(v) = ψ(v) = −`(v)/ρ∗` in Equation 7 instead,
we get ρ∗` · dem(Y ′|Z=0, Y ′|Z=1) ≥ Pr[Yˆ=1 | Z=0] −
Pr[Yˆ=1 | Z=1]. Finally, combining this inequality with
the previous one gives us
ρ∗` · dem(Y ′|Z=0, Y ′|Z=1)
≥
∣∣∣Pr[Yˆ=1 | Z=0]− Pr[Yˆ=1 | Z=1]∣∣∣
= dtv(Yˆ |Z=0, Yˆ |Z=1),
which is what we want.
We now briefly discuss the tightness of the above result. In
the extreme example where ` is a step function over real-
valued y′, ρ∗` is infinite, so we trivially have nondiscrimi-
nation under Definition 11. Therefore, in order to receive
meaningful fairness guarantees from Theorem 9, we must
make sure that ρ∗` is not too large. One way to achieve this
is to apply the function ` to the construct space and reason
about the transformed construct space. If any transforma-
tion of the construct space results in a finding of discrim-
ination under Definition 11, then it is evidence that there
could be a problem with the model with respect to discrim-
ination. Let y˜′ = `(y′) be a value in the transformed con-
struct space, and ˜` denote the likelihood function on this
space. Then,
˜`(y˜′) = Pr[Yˆ=1 | Y˜ ′=y˜′]
= Pr[Yˆ=1 | Y ′=y′] = `(y′) = y˜′,
so the transformation ensures that ρ∗˜` = 1.
A.3. Connection to the α-Disparity Test
When Y ′ and Y are numerical, a natural extension of the
α-disparity test (Definition 8) is
dtv(Yˆ |Z=0, Yˆ |Z=1) ≤ ρ∗` · α · dem(Y |Z=0, Y |Z=1).
(9)
For this to work, Worldview 3 would have to change to use
the earthmover distance rather than the total variation dis-
tance. Since the earthmover distance is defined over a dis-
tance metric, the parameter α is not very meaningful unless
Y ′ and Y have the same scale. As a result, here we con-
sider the case where Y ′ and Y are defined over the same
metric space (Y, d).
Unfortunately, Equation 9 is still not an empirical test be-
cause ρ∗` is defined in terms of Y
′. Although it is tempting
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to redefine ρ∗` in terms of Y , it is possible for Y
′ and Y to
have vastly different likelihood functions while having the
same disparity, so this new empirical test will not guaran-
tee the lack of DAU-Y ′ under Definition 11. We leave as
future work the discovery of the appropriate empirical test
for numerical Y ′ and Y under the α-Hybrid worldview.
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